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Note
City of Chicago v. Morales: Sacrificing Individual
Liberty Interests for Community Safety
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1992, the City of Chicago (the "City") passed the Gang Congrega-
tion Ordinance (the "Ordinance"), commonly referred to as the Anti-
Gang Loitering Ordinance, in an effort to combat criminal gang activity
on neighborhood streets.1 As a result of the Ordinance, law enforce-
ment officers forced approximately 46,000 persons to disperse from
neighborhood street corners.2 Law enforcement officers similarly asked
approximately another 43,000 persons to move on and arrested them
when they refused to do so.3 The vast majority of those arrested were
African American and Hispanic.
4
1. The Ordinance provides in part:
(a) Whenever a police officer observes a person whom he reasonably believes to be a
criminal street gang member loitering in any public place with one or more other per-
sons, he shall order all such persons to disperse and remove themselves from the area.
Any person who does not promptly obey such an order is in violation of this section.
(b) It shall be an affirmative defense to an alleged violation of this section that no per-
son who was observed loitering was in fact a member of a criminal street gang.
(c) As used in this Section:
(1) 'Loiter' means to remain in one place with no apparent purpose.
(2) 'Criminal street gang' means any ongoing organization, association in fact or
group of three or more persons, whether formal or informal, having as one of its
substantial activities the commission of one or more of the criminal acts... and
whose members individually or collectively engage in or have engaged in a pat-
tem of criminal gang activity....
(5) 'Public place' means the public way and any other location open to the public,
whether publicly or privately owned.
(d) Any person who violates this Section is subject to a fine of not less than $100.00 and
not more than $500.00 for each offense, or imprisonment for not more than six months,
or both.
CHICAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE § 8-4-015 (1995) (effective Aug. 1, 1992).
2. See City of Chicago v. Morales, 119 S. Ct. 1849, 1855 & n.7 (1999) [hereinafter Morales
III] afj'g 687 N.E.2d 53 (11. 1997).
3. See id.
4. See Lynn Sweet, Court to Sort Out Loitering Law: City, ACLU Quarrel Over Crackdown,
CHI. SUN TIMES, Dec. 6, 1998, at 14.
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Most importantly, the Ordinance allowed police to arrest anyone who
did not move on when asked whom police officers suspected of being a
gang member and anyone standing next to someone suspected of being
a gang member.5  Thus, under the Ordinance, police officers had the
discretion to determine whether an individual was or was not a gang
member.6 The broad scope of the Ordinance placed virtually everyone
in significant apprehension with regard to their freedom to simply stand
on a street corner without being ordered to leave under penalty of arrest,
fine and potential imprisonment.7 Moreover, the Ordinance penalized
gang membership, which in and of itself, is not a criminal activity.
8
Given the Ordinance's potential constitutional deficiencies, the
United States Supreme Court considered the Ordinance's constitution-
ality in City of Chicago v. Morales ("Morales IIr').9 The Court, in a six
to three decision, generated six different opinions and failed to marshal
a majority opinion on the critical issue of whether loitering is a consti-
tutionally protected individual liberty interest.10 Instead, striking the
Ordinance on grounds of vagueness," the United States Supreme Court
left open the door for upholding as constitutional a more carefully
worded anti-loitering ordinance.
This Note first briefly explores the background of vagrancy and loi-
tering ordinances in the United States and the circumstances that gave
5. See Morales 111, 119 S. Ct. at 1854 n.2 (citing CHICAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE § 8-4-015(a)
(1992)) (stating that whether someone is a criminal street gang member is based on the police
officer's reasonable belief that any person standing in a public place may be a gang member).
6. See id. at 1861-62 (discussing police officer discretion in determining gang membership
and purpose).
7. See id. at 1862 n.34 (citing applicability of the Ordinance to non-gang members and in-
stances of arrests); see also id. at 1866 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment) ("[I]t leaves many individuals, gang members and non-gang members alike, subject to its
strictures.").
8. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) (declaring unconstitutional a Califor-
nia state law that provided for imprisonment of narcotics addicts, absent any further requirement
of "irregular behavior"). The Illinois Appellate Court held that the Ordinance in effect criminal-
ized status. See City of Chicago v. Youkhana, 660 N.E.2d 34, 41 (111. App. Ct. 1995), aff'd sub
nom. Morales 111, 119 S. Ct. 1849 (1999). Nonetheless, neither the Illinois Supreme Court nor
the United States Supreme Court reached this issue. See Morales 111, 119 S. Ct. at 1856. Ac-
cordingly, this Note will not cover this issue as raised by the Illinois Appellate Court.
9. Morales 111, 119 S. Ct. 1849 (1999), affg 687 N.E.2d 53 (Ill. 1997).
10. See id. at 1857-58. One commentator characterized the decision "as a test of whether this
is still an 'individual liberties' Court or whether... community interests have shifted the Court
away from that historic emphasis." Tony Mauro, It's Not Just About Loitering, LEGAL TIMES,
Nov. 30, 1998, at 2; see also infra notes 239-52 and accompanying text (discussing the conflict
between individual liberty and community interest).
11. See Morales 111, 119 S. Ct. at 1856.
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rise to the City of Chicago's enactment of the Ordinance at issue. 12
This Note will then discuss the United States Supreme Court's modern
treatment of anti-loitering ordinances and, particularly, the Court's ap-
plication of the void-for-vagueness doctrine. 13  This Note will then
explain the bases for the Illinois Supreme Court's opinion, the opinion
of the United States Supreme Court majority, and the dissenting opin-
ions in Morales 111.14 Next, this Note will address the weaknesses in the
majority's opinion because it failed to hold that loitering should be a
constitutionally protected liberty interest, 15 thereby refusing to expand
the reach of the Court's earlier decision in Papachristou v. City of
Jacksonville.16 Finally, this Note will discuss the impact of the Court's
decision on a citizen's right to loiter for innocent purposes. 17
II. BACKGROUND
Antiquated Elizabethan poor laws,18 which have served as the model
for most American vagrancy laws, 19 have given way to modern day
anti-loitering ordinances. 20  United States lawmakers have promulgated
these anti-loitering statutes as a means to prevent crime.21  Prior to this
crime prevention purpose, however, lawmakers sometimes used va-
grancy law in the United States for sinister goals. For example, in the
12. See infra Part 11.
13. See infra Parts II.A-B.
14. See infra Parts 1.D, III.
15. See infra Part IV.
16. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972) (holding that a vagrancy ordi-
nance was void-for-vagueness because it failed to give fair notice of prohibited conduct); see also
infra Part I.B.I.
17. See infra Part V.
18. One commentator described fourteenth century England in the following manner:
[Tihe breakup of feudalism and the depopulation caused by the Black Death, created a se-
vere labor shortage in England. As a result... laborers began to travel the country offering
their services to the highest bidder. In response, Parliament passed the Statutes of Labour-
ers ... compelling workers to remain in certain areas and establishing a fixed wage. In
1530, able bodied vagrants who did not offer themselves to work were subjected to such
penalties as whipping... and bodily mutilation.
Peter W. Poulos, Comment, Chicago's Ban on Gang Loitering: Making Sense of Vagueness and
Overbreadth in Loitering Laws, 83 CAL. L. REV. 379, 385-86 (1995). Other penalties included a
two year enslavement period for those who "liveth idly and loiteringly, by the space of three
days." Mark Malone, Note, Homelessness in a Modern Urban Setting, 10 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
749, 754 n.17 (1982). Thus, "[i]nitially English vagrancy and loitering statutes had an economic
rationale." Id. at 754.
19. See Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 161-62 (stating that the Jacksonville, Florida statutes "de-
rived from early English law").
20. See Poulos, supra note 18, at 386.
21. See id.
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late nineteenth century, following the end of the Civil War, southern
states, such as Alabama, broadened their vagrancy statutes to limit the
freedom of former slaves in an attempt to keep them in a "state of quasi
slavery." 2
2
Furthermore, by the middle of the twentieth century, the police could
arrest individuals as they deemed appropriate under vagrancy laws to
maintain order in public places, often with discriminatory results. 23 In-
deed, many citizens were at the mercy of the police and arrested under
catch-all vagrancy laws that criminalized their status of "rogue," "vaga-
bond," or "habitual loafer." 24 Several of the laws sought to punish "idle
or dissolute" itinerants, 25 or those who led "an idle, immoral or profli-
gate... life."'26  Sometimes such laws even extended to "common pip-
ers and fiddlers." 27  Such laws, Justice Felix Frankfurter avowed in
1948, constituted "a class by themselves" in which exact statutory lan-
guage was "designedly avoided so as to allow the net to be cast at large,
to enable men to be caught who are vaguely undesirable in the eyes of
police and prosecution, although not chargeable with any particular of-
fense." 28 The police used their authority primarily against those typi-
cally subjected to increased police surveillance. These included those
persons generally unable to adequately assert their rights through the
political process, 29 such as the poor, juveniles and minorities. 30
22. Morales 111, 119 S. Ct. 1847, 1857 n.20 (1999), aff'g 687 N.E.2d 53 (I11. 1997). The Ala-
bama statute included "any runaway, stubborn servant or child" and "a laborer or servant who
loiters away his time, or refuses to comply with any contract for a term of service without just
cause." Id. (citing T. WILSON, BLACK CODES OF THE SOUTH 76 (1965)); see also Robin Yea-
mans, Recent Development, 20 STAN. L. REV. 782 (1968) (providing a detailed history of va-
grancy/loitering laws in the United States).
23. See Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places: Courts,
Communities, and the New Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 551, 595 (1997).
24. Jeffrey S. Adler, A Historical Analysis of the Law of Vagrancy, 27 CRIMINOLOGY 209,
216 (1989) (discussing how vagrancy laws, dating back to early America, had become "bloated
and distorted" by the middle of the twentieth century and ordinances became "longer and more
detailed as legislators ... continued to confront challenges to social order and community life by
enlarging [their] scope"); see also Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 156 n.1 (citing a Jacksonville, Flor-
ida ordinance classifying "rogues," "vagabonds," "common drunkards," "common night walk-
ers," "disorderly persons," and "persons wandering or strolling around from place to place with-
out any lawful purpose or object," among others, as vagrants subject to criminal sanctions).
25. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-991(4) (West 1956) (repealed 1977) (discussing
the vagrancy law that targeted idle or dissolute itinerants).
26. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 40-8-19 (1963) (discussing the vagrancy law including this
designation, among others).
27. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 856.02 (West 1965) (repealed 1972) (including jugglers, com-
mon pipers, fiddlers, among others).
28. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 540 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (describing
the detriments of an overly vague law that empowers the police with unfettered discretion).
29. See Livingston, supra note 23, at 596 (citations omitted).
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Virtually all of these laws went unchallenged until 1963, when the
United States Supreme Court recognized that indigent defendants in fel-
ony criminal prosecutions in state courts had the right to counsel.31
Until that time, those who were most likely to be arrested and prose-
cuted under these vagrancy laws, the homeless and indigent, lacked the
means to bring any constitutional challenge.32
A. Constitutional Challenges to Loitering Laws
The two most frequent constitutional challenges to loitering laws are
the void-for-vagueness and overbreadth doctrines. 33  The void-for-
vagueness doctrine stems from the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. 34  This doctrine requires that a law: (1) give
persons of "ordinary intelligence fair notice" of what conduct is prohib-
ited; and (2) provide definite standards to police officers to prevent ar-
bitrary and discriminatory enforcement. 35 The overbreadth doctrine, on
the other hand, emanates from the First Amendment. 36 Under this doc-
30. See id.; see also William J. Stuntz, Implicit Bargains, Government Power, and the Fourth
Amendment, 44 STAN. L. REV. 553, 560 (1992) (noting that traditional loitering and vagrancy
laws have been "politically tolerable" because people acquiesced to police authority when it was
utilized against "undesirables").
31. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343-44 (1963). In Gideon, the Court ended the
dispute among federal and state courts and held that criminal defendants had the right to counsel
pursuant to the Sixth Amendment, which the Court made obligatory on the states via the Four-
teenth Amendment. See id.
32. See Morales 111, 119 S. Ct. 1849, 1857 n.20 (1999) aff'g 687 N.E.2d 53 (Ill. 1997) (ob-
serving that anti-loitering laws were rarely challenged until indigents obtained the right to counsel
pursuant to Gideon).
33. See Poulos, supra note 18, at 382. Although the void-for-vagueness and overbreadth doc-
trines are the two most common constitutional challenges to loitering ordinances, they are not the
only mechanisms available. See id. Loitering laws have also been challenged on other grounds.
See, e.g., Farber v. Rochford, 407 F. Supp. 529, 533 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (discussing Eighth Amend-
ment implications and stating that "one cannot be constitutionally punished because of one's
status"); Wyche v. State, 619 So.2d 231, 238 (Fla. 1993) (Kogan, J., concurring) (dealing with a
challenge based on the Equal Protection Clause); City of Milwaukee v. Nelson, 439 N.W.2d 562,
569-72 (Wis. 1989) (involving Fourth Amendment safeguards against unreasonable search and
seizure).
34. The Fifth Amendment, which applies to the federal government, provides that "[n]o per-
sonal shall be... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST.
amend. V. The Fourteenth Amendment, which applies to the states, provides that "[n]o State
shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
35. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972). For additional analyses of
the void-for-vagueness doctrine, see John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Con-
struction of Penal Statutes, 71 VA. L. REV. 189 (1985); Mark A. Richard, Comment, The Void-
For-Vagueness Doctrine in Village of Hoffman Estates v. The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc.:
Revision or Misapplication?, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 1273 (1983).
36. The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the free-
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trine, if a law proscribes activities that are not constitutionally protected
while at the same time covers activities that are protected by the First
Amendment, the law may be deemed overbroad.37
1. Void-For-Vagueness
Although the void-for-vagueness doctrine is rooted in due process
concerns, the doctrine also promotes the fundamental values of First
Amendment freedoms. 38 That is, it serves to prevent the deterrent or
"chilling effect" that certain laws may have upon otherwise innocent
behavior. 39 It is a rudimentary principle of due process that in order for
a law to proscribe specific conduct, that law must distinctly set forth the
forbidden behavior.4° Thus, the vagueness doctrine has limited the
range of activities that loitering laws may bring within their scope,
41
thereby protecting activities that may fall within the scope of the First
Amendment. 42
The traditional focus of the void-for-vagueness doctrine, however,
has centered on the facets of notice requirements and equitable en-
forcement guidelines. Pursuant to the Court's historic formulation of
the notice requirement, "a penal statute [must] define the criminal of-
fense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand
what conduct is prohibited ... Notably, however, a state may sat-
isfy the doctrine's notice requirement simply by publishing a law, re-
dom of speech... or the right of the people peaceably to assemble." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
37. See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 104-05 (1940) (striking down an Alabama statute
that unconstitutionally restrained freedom of speech and press by prohibiting any person from
going near or loitering about, without just cause, a business establishment of any other person
conducting a lawful business). For additional analyses of the overbreadth doctrine, see Richard
H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J. 853 (1991); Jeffrey M. Shaman, The
First Amendment Rule Against Overbreadth, 52 TEMP. L.Q. 259 (1979); J.W. Torke, The Future
of First Amendment Overbreadth, 27 VAND. L. REV. 289 (1974).
38. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972).
39. See Poulos, supra note 18, at 383; see also Grayned, 408 U.S. at 109. The Grayned Court
noted, "where a vague statute abut[s] upon sensitive areas of basic First Amendment freedoms, it
operates to inhibit the exercise of [those] freedoms. Uncertain meanings inevitably lead citizens
to steer far wider of the unlawful zone ... than if the boundaries of the forbidden areas were
clearly marked." Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
40. See Poulos, supra note 18, at 389-90 (citing United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617
(1954)).
41. See id. at 390-91.
42. See Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108.
43. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983) (citing Connally v. General Constr. Co.,
269 U.S. 385 (1926)). In Connally, the Court held that "a statute which either forbids or requires
the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at
its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process law." Con-
nally, 269 U.S. at 391.
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gardless of how inaccessible the notice may be to the average citizen.44
Indeed, comprehending the scope and ramifications of a law often en-
tails in-depth legal investigation and analysis, which is unlikely to be
undertaken by an ordinary citizen.
45
Nevertheless, absent the state's failure to provide notice, "ignorance
of the law is no defense" 46 and the offender may still face punitive
sanctions. 47 Given the limited amount of actual notice that is required
to constitute notice in our justice system, the premise of fair warning
provides little help to the ordinary citizen.48 As such, it is not surprising
that commentators have consistently professed that the notice require-
ment is not the strongest rationale for the use of the vagueness doc-
trine. 49
Importantly, the United States Supreme Court has also indicated that
a far more compelling basis for the use of the vagueness doctrine is the
prevention of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of laws.5° This
rationale for the vagueness doctrine is analogous to the legal principle
of the "rule of law," 51 which "signifies the constraint of arbitrariness in
the exercise of government power." 52 Through its insistence on precise
guidelines, the vagueness doctrine attempts to prevent law enforcement
authorities from relying on irrational, subjective criteria, such as race
and ethnicity. 53 Absent precise guidelines, law enforcement authorities
are forced to discern obscure and sometimes non-existent principles. 54
44. See Jeffries, supra note 35, at 207.
45. See id. at 208.
46. Poulos, supra note 18, at 390.
47. See Jeffries, supra note 35, at 208-09; see also Morales I1, 119 S. Ct. 1849, 1865 (1999)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment), aff'g 687 N.E.2d 53 (Ill. 1997).
In Morales III, Justice Kennedy stated:
[Slome police commands will subject a citizen to prosecution for disobeying whether or
not the citizen knows why the order is given, Illustrative examples include when the police
tell a pedestrian not to enter a building and the reason is to avoid impeding a rescue
team... It does not follow, however, that any unexplained police order must be obeyed
without notice of the lawfulness of the order.
Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
48. See Poulos, supra note 18, at 390.
49. See, e.g., Jeffries, supra note 35, at 205-12 (asserting that the notice requirement is not the
principal underpinning of the vagueness doctrine).
50. See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357-58 (1983) (citations omitted) (holding that a
California statute was void-for-vagueness).
51. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1332 (6th ed. 1990). BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY defines
the rule of law as "a legal principle... provid[ing] that decisions should be made by the applica-
tion of known principles or laws without the intervention of discretion." Id.
52. Jeffries, supra note 35, at 212.
53. See id. at 213.
54. Cf. Poulos, supra note 18, at 390.
1999]
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Given this obscurity and lack of guidance, law enforcement authorities'
interpretation of a vague law may vary with respect to its operation and
implementation, thereby resulting in arbitrary and discriminatory en-
forcement. 55  Thus, commentators have recognized the essential role
that the vagueness doctrine plays in enabling the judiciary to eliminate
the underlying bias and prejudice in law enforcement.56
Certain commentators further believe that, in general, legislators
should attempt to draft laws that provide guidelines to enable enforce-
ment officials to objectively apply such laws. 57 Even though it may not
be practical to create a mechanical or exact legal system, it is neverthe-
less necessary to create laws that "promote regularity, certainty [and]
predictability .... -18 Absent such guidelines, however, individuals
faced with laws that are unevenly administered 59 may ultimately have
their constitutional right to equal protection of the law squandered by
55. See id. (proposing that vague laws encourage arbitrary and subjective motivations and im-
plementation of laws by officers).
56. See, e.g., Jeffries, supra note 35, at 212 (discussing the vagueness doctrine and its relation
to the concept of the rule of law).
57. See id. Certain commentators have maintained that although it may be impossible to draft
a law with such precision that it leaves absolutely no discretion to enforcement authorities, it is
feasible to provide guidelines "by openly acknowledged, relatively stable, and generally applica-
ble statements of proscribed conduct." Id. These commentators further assert that laws should
seek to "retard[ ] ... misuse of government power for private ends, and the unacknowledged reli-
ance on illegitimate criteria of selection." Id. Additionally, commentators contend that authori-
ties should continue to seek the evenhanded administration of the laws for all individuals, re-
gardless of their race, ethnicity, gender or personal affiliations. See id. at 213-14.
58. Id. at 213.
59. The problem of uneven administration of the laws is exacerbated by the fact that, since the
1990s, there has been a resurgence in the participation of local community residents in the polic-
ing of their neighborhoods. See Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, The Coming Crisis of
Criminal Procedure, 86 GEO. L.J. 1153, 1160 (1998) (attributing this resurgence to the fact that
"[a]pproximately three-quarters of the Nation's 200 largest cities now have curfew laws"). In-
deed, along with an increase in both resident contact with government officials and involvement
in community organizations, this new type of community policing also involves an increase in
discretionary policing strategies. See id. at 1161-62. For example, in some cities public housing
officials attempted to augment police authority to the extent that police would be permitted to
conduct warrantless searches after receiving accounts of random gunfire in the area. See id. at
1161 (citation omitted). Despite this increased discretion, advocates of community policing have
argued that this strategy is necessary to preserve American cities. See generally Livingston, su-
pra note 23, at 558 (citing JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES 29-
54 (1961)). Specifically, advocates contend that this strategy will reduce crime, largely because
of community members' increased awareness of activity occurring in neighborhoods. See id. at
559. Moreover, citizens are willing to accept these discretionary police strategies and the corre-
sponding abridgment of liberty interests in order to maintain safety and security in their commu-
nities. See Morales 111, 119 S. Ct. 1849, 1867 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (asserting that it is
within the rights of Chicagoans to decide whether it is worth restricting some of their freedom to
eliminate the gang problems by proscribing loitering without an apparent purpose) aff'g 687
N.E.2d 53 (I11. 997).
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such disparate enforcement. 60 Therefore, by promoting the "rule of
law" principle and substantially restricting the vagueness permitted in a
law, the vagueness doctrine diminishes the potential for these constitu-
tional violations to occur.6
1
2. Overbreadth Doctrine and First Amendment Freedoms
Like the void-for-vagueness doctrine, the overbreadth doctrine seeks
to prevent laws that are overly broad from infringing upon certain inno-
cent conduct, particularly conduct that is protected by the First Amend-
ment.62 Indeed, the primary rationale for the overbreadth doctrine is to
provide "breathing space" for First Amendment freedoms. 63 Laws that
are overly broad, like those that are overly vague, may have a deterrent
effect on a person's willful exercise of his or her constitutional rights.64
In particular, if individuals are unable to determine whether their actions
will cause a law to be invoked against them and subsequently whether
the courts will shield their actions, they may abandon the exercise of
their First Amendment freedoms out of fear of recrimination. 65  Finally,
60. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464-65 (1996) (finding that "[a] defendant
may demonstrate that the administration of a criminal law is 'directed so exclusively against a
particular class of persons.., with a mind so unequal and oppressive' that the system of prose-
cution amounts 'to a practical denial' of equal protection of the law") (quoting Yick Wo v. Hop-
kins, 118 U.S. 356, 373 (1886)).
61. See Poulos, supra note 18, at 390 (proposing that strictures on the law will encourage uni-
form enforcement).
62. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). In NAACP v. Alabama, the Court held
unconstitutional Alabama's demand that the NAACP disclose the names and addresses of all its
Alabama members. See id. at 466. This demand was the result of an injunction action brought in
1956 to stop the organization from conducting activities in Alabama. See id. at 452. The Court
stated that Alabama's disclosure demand "entail[ed] the likelihood of a substantial restraint upon
the exercise by petitioner's members of their right to freedom of association." Id. at 462.
63. See Jeffries, supra note 35, at 216 (noting that when "legal uncertainty threatens free ex-
pression, the search for indefiniteness has a special rigor"). In particular, the First Amendment
includes the freedom of speech, press, assembly and religion. See generally Edward J. Larson,
The Scopes Trial and the Evolving Concept of Freedom, 85 VA. L. REV. 503, 517 (1999) (dis-
cussing how previously these guaranties only "applied to restrictions imposed by the federal gov-
ernment").
64. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963). The Button Court stated that "[First
Amendment] freedoms are delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society.
The threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual application of
sanctions." Id.; see also GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
1327 (13th ed. 1997) (stating that the Supreme Court assumes an overbroad law might induce
others not before the Court to refrain from speech or expression guaranteed by the Constitution).
65. See Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 520-21 (1972) (holding unconstitutional on grounds
of vagueness and overbreadth a Georgia statute that charged a misdemeanor against any person
who, in the presence of another and without provocation, used obscene language that tended to
cause a breach of the peace).
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another rationale for the overbreadth doctrine is to prevent the arbitrary
and discriminatory enforcement of the laws. 66
As previously noted, a law will be deemed overly broad under this
doctrine if, while proscribing conduct that is not constitutionally pro-
tected, it also "sweeps within its coverage activities that are protected
by the First Amendment." 67  In its earliest application of the over-
breadth doctrine, the Supreme Court found a statute unconstitutionally
broad when it encompassed constitutionally unprotected activities, as
well as constitutionally protected ones. 68
The Supreme Court significantly limited early applications of the
overbreadth doctrine through its decision in Broadrick v. Oklahoma.69
In Broadrick, the Court differentiated between laws governing pure
speech and those fundamentally restricting conduct. 70  In connection
with laws governing pure speech, the Court did not modify the over-
breadth doctrine. 71 The Court did, however, modify the overbreadth
doctrine in connection with laws regulating conduct, even conduct with
an expressive element that implicates a First Amendment freedom. 72 In
this context, the majority surmised that for facial invalidation73 to be
proper "the overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but substan-
tial as well, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate
sweep." 74 Therefore, according to the Broadrick Court, the mere exis-
tence of expressive conduct is insufficient to invoke an overbreadth
analysis. 75
B. Modern Treatment of Loitering Laws in the United States
Loitering laws have long been attacked under the vagueness doctrine
66. See Poulos, supra note 18, at 392.
67. Id. (citing Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97 (1940), which held unconstitutional a
statute that banned all picketing).
68. See Thornhill, 310 U.S. at 97. Therefore, regardless of a state's interest in a law, if a court
determined that a law was overly inclusive in its reach of First Amendment activities, it struck
down the law as overbroad. See id.
69. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
70. See id. at 615.
71. See Poulos, supra note 18, at 392 (construing Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 601).
72. See id.
73. For facial invalidation to be applicable, there must be no set of circumstances under which
a statute could be valid. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987).
74. Poulos, supra note 18, at 392 (quoting Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
75. See id. Thus, for cases encompassing conduct, Broadrick recast "the overbreadth analysis
from a mechanical method of adjudication to a qualitative evaluation of a law's impermissible
applications in light of its permissible scope." Id.
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because they are susceptible to potential arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement. 76 Moreover, the courts have become increasingly critical
of loitering laws that fail to join the act of loitering with an additional
element of criminal conduct.
77
The term "loitering" is defined as "[tlo be dilatory... to stand around
or move slowly about; to stand idly around; to saunter; to lag behind; to
linger or spend time idly." 78 As defined, the term "loitering" is nor-
mally not associated with illegal, even though potentially unwelcome,
conduct. The difficulty with loitering ordinances, then, is that they of-
ten reach innocent, non-criminal conduct. 79 Moreover, the ambiguity in
the definition of loitering may lead to differing interpretations of the
term. Thus, although one observer may believe someone is loitering,
another observer could believe that the same person's conduct has an
apparent purpose. 80 Indeed, that purpose may even include certain con-
stitutionally protected rights such as freedom of association.
81
1. Supreme Court Interpretations of Loitering Laws
The Supreme Court has required the presence of some type of im-
proper conduct in addition to the act of loitering in order for a loitering
law to be upheld as constitutional. For example, in Shuttlesworth v.
76. See Jeffries, supra note 35, at 214-18.
77. See City of Chicago v. Morales, 687 N.E.2d 53, 60 (I11. 1997) (stating that laws that ban
loitering without other criminal activity are most likely unconstitutional) [hereinafter "Morales
I"], aff'd, 119 S. Ct. 1849 (1999); see also State v. Bitt, 798 P.2d 43, 48-50 (Idaho 1990) (hold-
ing unconstitutionally vague an ordinance that criminalized loitering at unusual times or places
because the ordinance did not provide sufficient guidelines, thereby granting the police the sole
discretion in making arrests); People v. Villaneuva, 318 N.Y.S.2d 167, 168, 171 (N.Y. City Ct.
1971) (holding unconstitutionally vague an ordinance that prohibited loitering under suspicious
circumstances with no apparent purpose and that required a person to provide a credible reason
for his or her presence to a law enforcement officer); Howard v. State, 617 S.W.2d 191, 192 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1979) (en banc) (holding unconstitutionally vague an ordinance that rendered illegal
being out at night under suspicious circumstances if unable to provide a satisfactory explanation
of purpose).
78. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 942 (6th ed. 1990).
79. See Morales If, 687 N.E.2d at 60-61 (noting that the definition of loitering in the Ordi-
nance drew no distinction "between innocent conduct and conduct calculated to cause harm").
80. For example, the Ordinance at issue in the Morales decisions defined "loiter" to mean "to
remain in any one place with no apparent purpose." Morales IHI, 119 S. Ct. 1849, 1854 n.2
(1999) (citing CHICAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE § 8-4-015(c)(1) (1992)), aff'g 687 N.E.2d 53 (I11.
1997). Under this definition, "[pleople with entirely legitimate and lawful purposes will not al-
ways be able to make their purposes apparent to an observing police officer." Morales 1H, 687
N.E.2d at 61. Indeed, a "person waiting to hail a taxi, resting on a corner during a jog, or step-
ping into a doorway to evade a rain shower has a perfectly legitimate purpose ... however, that
purpose will rarely be apparent to an observer." Id.
81. See City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 23-25 (1989) (discussing the constitutionally
protected right of freedom of association).
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City of Birmingham,82 the Court noted that when read literally, the
city's loitering ordinance stated that a person could only stand on a
public sidewalk at the whim of a law enforcement officer. 83 Under such
an interpretation, the Court held that the ordinance did "not provide for
government by clearly defined laws, but rather for government by the
moment-to-moment opinions of a policeman," and accordingly, was
impermissibly vague.84 Therefore, absent an additional requirement of
actual undesirable behavior in connection with the act of loitering, the
Court held that such an ordinance is unconstitutional.85
In contrast to Shuttlesworth, Coates v. City of Cincinnati86 provides
an example of the type of ordinance that is invalid because it reaches a
certain type of constitutionally protected conduct. 87 The ordinance im-
plicated in Coates made it a criminal offense for "'three or more per-
sons to assemble ... on any of the sidewalks ... and there conduct
themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing by."' 88 The Coates
Court held that this ordinance was unconstitutionally vague on its face
because it "subject[ed] the exercise of the right of assembly to an unas-
certainable standard.- 89 In addition, the Court held that the ordinance
was unconstitutionally broad because it permitted penalization of the
constitutionally protected right of free assembly and association. 9° Fi-
nally, the Court explained that the constitutionally protected rights of
freedom of association and assembly may not be abridged solely on the
basis of public intolerance or animosity.91
82. Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87 (1965).
83. See id. at 90; see also City of St. Louis v. Burton, 478 S.W.2d 320, 321-23 (Mo. 1972)
(holding an ordinance that prohibited, among other things, loitering on a street comer and refus-
ing a law enforcement authority's request to disperse as unconstitutional based on vagueness and
overbreadth); State v. Hudson, 274 A.2d 878, 879-80 (N.H. 1971) (striking down an ordinance
that barred loitering in front of business establishments after being instructed by a law enforce-
ment authority to disperse).
84. Shuttlesworth, 382 U.S. at 90 (quoting Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 579 (1965)) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted).
85. See id. at 91.
86. Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971).
87. See id. at 615.
88. Id. at 611 (quoting CINCINNATI, OH., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 901-L6 (1956)).
89. Id. at 614 (holding'that the ordinance violated the due process standards of vagueness,
"not in the sense that it requires a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehen-
sible normative standard, but rather in the sense that no standard of conduct is specified at all").
90. See id. at 615.
91. See id. at 615; see also Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969) (holding that use of
the word "damn" could not support a conviction under a New York statute because of the consti-
tutional guarantee of free speech); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 551 (1965) (finding a Louisi-
ana statute that disallowed congregation with others with an intent to provoke a breach of peace
violated free speech rights); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 238 (1963) (overturning
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2. The Seminal Case: Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville
The most important case addressing loitering ordinances 92 is Pa-
pachristou v. City of Jacksonville.93 In Papachristou, the Supreme
Court implicitly recognized the freedom to loiter for innocent purposes
as a constitutionally protected liberty interest.94 The ordinance at issue
in Papachristou prohibited, among other things, "'wandering or stroll-
ing around from place to place without any lawful purpose or object."' 95
The Court held the law was void-for-vagueness because it: (1) failed to
give people of ordinary intelligence fair notice that their intended con-
duct was forbidden; 96 (2) encouraged arbitrary and erratic arrests; 97 (3)
made criminal those activities which by modern standards are normally
innocent;98 and (4) placed unfettered discretion in the hands of the po-
lice. 99
In so holding, the Court focused first on the lack of notice ordinary
citizens received under the ordinance.'l° The Court noted that with any
law, it is supposed that all persons are entitled to be informed of what
conduct is prohibited. 10 1 The ordinance at issue in Papachristou, how-
criminal convictions because speech that stirred anger and unrest in others was free speech);
Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 6 (1949) (holding that petitioner did not violate a Chicago
ordinance for excited speech due to First Amendment rights); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296, 311 (1940) (upholding right of free speech, finding conduct was not a menace to the public
peace); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939) (stating that courts have a duty to examine
and possibly overturn legislation that abridges rights to free speech and press).
92. Although the ordinance at issue in Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville involved a va-
grancy law, it should be noted that "loitering" is a term included within the definition of "va-
grancy." See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1549 (6th ed. 1990).
93. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
94. See id. at 164. In Papachristou, Justice Douglas, writing for a unanimous Court, stated
that "these activities [walking, wandering and strolling] are historically part of the amenities of
life as we have known them." Id. Although acknowledging that these amenities "are not men-
tioned in the Constitution or Bill of Rights," Justice Douglas asserted that, nevertheless, these
activities are deeply embedded in our traditional notions of freedom. Id.
95. Id. at 156-57 n.1 (quoting JACKSONVILLE, FLA., ORDINANCE CODE § 26-57 (1965)).
96. See id. at 162.
97. See id.
98. See id. at 164. The Papachristou Court noted that the ordinance's qualification "'without
any lawful purpose or object' may be a trap for innocent acts. Persons 'neglecting all lawful
business and habitually spending their time by frequenting ... places where alcoholic beverages
are sold and served' would literally embrace many members of golf clubs and city clubs." Id.
(quoting JACKSONVILLE, FLA., ORDINANCE CODE § 26-57 (1965)). The Court further stated that
the broad sweep of this vagrancy ordinance allowed the legislature to "'set a net large enough to
catch all possible offenders,"' leaving the courts to decide who should be detained and who
should be set free. Id. at 165 (quoting United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221 (1875)).
99. See id. at 168.
100. See id. at 162 (citing United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954)).
101. See id. (citing Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939)).
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ever, failed to define the specific prohibited conduct and, therefore, ne-
glected to adequately apprise citizens of its potential application to their
activities.10 2 As a result, the law subjected indigents, minorities and or-
dinary citizens to arbitrary and erratic arrests.10 3
Next, the Supreme Court found that the conduct the ordinance in-
tended to proscribe was of the type that is normally considered inno-
cent. 104 For example, the ordinance made "nightwalking" criminal. 10 5
The Court determined that an ordinary citizen could not have been
aware that such activity was illegal in the City of Jacksonville, particu-
larly when the activity had "historically [been] part of the amenities of
life."106
Finally, the Supreme Court decided that the ordinance placed unfet-
tered discretion "in the hands of the Jacksonville police."' 1 7 Indeed, the
Court found that the vagrancy law was merely a facade enabling police
to obtain an arrest based on undisclosed grounds. 10 8 Although police
are permitted only to make arrests based on probable cause, the ordi-
nance essentially permitted police to arrest anyone they believed to be
"suspicious" under the veil of the vagrancy law. 1°9 As such, the Court
found that the ordinance attempted to circumvent the probable cause re-
quirement by incorporating inherently vague language. "10
C. Chicago's Need for An Anti-Gang Loitering Ordinance
In 1992, the City of Chicago enacted the Anti-Gang Loitering Ordi-
nance in an effort to combat the pervasive criminal gang activity on its
city streets. 11' Shortly thereafter, the City began enforcing the Ordi-
102. See id.
103. See id. (citing Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940)).
104. See id. at 163. The Court stated that "[w]e know, however, from experience, that sleep-
less people often walk at night, perhaps hopeful that sleep-inducing relaxation will result." Id.
105. See id. at 156 n.1 (citing JACKSONVILLE, FLA., ORDINANCE CODE § 26-57 (1965)).
106. Id. at 164.
107. Id. at 168.
108. See id. at 169.
109. See id. The Papachristou Court stated, "[where... there are no standards governing the
exercise of the discretion granted by the ordinance, the scheme permits and encourages an arbi-
trary and discriminatory enforcement of the law. It furnishes a convenient tool for 'harsh and
discriminatory enforcement by local prosecuting officials, against particular groups."' Id. at 170
(quoting Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97-98 (1940)).
110. See id. at 169 (stating that police may only make arrests on probable cause-"a Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendment standard applicable to the States as well as to the federal govern-
ment"-and that arresting a person on suspicion is unacceptable in our system and future crimi-
nality is no justification for vagrancy statutes).
111. See infra note 117 (setting forth the Chicago City Council's findings regarding the ef-
fects of gang activity in the city).
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nance following passage of General Order 92-4 (the "Order" or "Gen-
eral Order") which was intended to provide general guidelines for en-
forcement of the Ordinance. 1 2 Under the Order, police were permitted
to issue an order to disperse whenever they reasonably believed that one
of the persons loitering in an area was a gang member.
113
Prior to enacting the Ordinance, the City Council conducted public
hearings during which numerous witnesses testified to the effects of
gang activity on their neighborhoods and their daily lives. 114  Local
residents provided testimony regarding how gang members "loiter as
part of a strategy to claim territory, recruit new members, and intimidate
rival gangs and ordinary community residents.""' 5 Further testimony
also revealed that street gangs caused various forms of criminal activity
in an area, including drug dealing, drive-by shootings, vandalism and
intimidation. 116
Following the hearings, the City Council determined that it was nec-
essary to promulgate an ordinance that would control criminal gang ac-
tivity and stated its findings in the preamble to the Ordinance."17  These
112. See City of Chicago v. Youkhana, 660 N.E.2d 34, 36-37 (11. App. Ct. 1995), aff'd sub
nom. Morales 11, 119 S. Ct. 1849 (1999). The Order delineated conditions under which police
officers were permitted to enforce the Ordinance. The court in Youkhana construed the Order as
allowing police to:
[O]rder persons loitering in a designated area 'to disperse and remove themselves from the
area' when there is probable cause to believe that at least one of those persons is a criminal
street-gang member. [Police] are then directed to arrest and charge 'any person who does
not promptly obey such an order.' The order requires the arresting officer to complete the
arrest report for each arrest, which provides specific reasons for a conclusion of probable
cause that the arrestee was either a criminal street gang or a person loitering in a group with
a gang member.
Id. (quoting General Order No. 92-4, at 3 (1992)).
113. See id.
114. See Morales II1, 119 S. Ct. 1849, 1887 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting testi-
mony of one Chicago resident that "[tihere is only about maybe one or two percent of the people
in the city causing these problems maybe, but it's keeping 98 percent of us in our houses and off
the streets and afraid to shop") (citation omitted), affg 687 N.E.2d 53 (Il1. 1997).
115. Morales H, 687 N.E.2d 53. 57-58 (I11. 1997), aff'd, 119 S. Ct. 1849 (1999).
116. Seeid.at58.
117. See id. The preamble provides:
WHEREAS, The City of Chicago, like other cities across the nation, has been experiencing
an increasing murder rate as well as an increase in violent and drug related crimes; and
WHEREAS, The City Council has determined that the continuing increase in criminal
street gang activity in the City is largely responsible for this unacceptable situation; and
WHEREAS, In many neighborhoods throughout the City, the burgeoning presence of street
gang members in public places has intimidated many law abiding citizens; and
WHEREAS, One of the methods by which criminal street gangs establish control over
identifiable areas is by loitering in those areas and intimidating others from entering those
areas; and
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findings were the result of testimony from those living in the communi-
ties most directly effected by gang activity and also from testimony of
church leaders and other community activists."l 8
D. Background of Morales I
Shortly after the City began enforcing the Ordinance, certain indi-
viduals challenged the constitutionality of the Ordinance in separate
court proceedings, in which they were defendants. Of the thirteen
challenges to the Ordinance's constitutionality, eleven trial court judges
held the Ordinance unconstitutional, while only two trial court judges
upheld the Ordinance as valid.1 19 In one case, the court convicted de-
fendant Jesus Morales, who was arrested because his blue and black
clothing, the colors of a local street gang, led an officer to believe he
belonged to a gang. 120
Yet, in another challenge, a trial court held that the Ordinance failed
to notify persons of what conduct was proscribed and encouraged arbi-
trary enforcement by police. 121 In addition, the court held that the Ordi-
nance inappropriately permitted arrests based on a person's status, and
was "facially overbroad" under the First Amendment of the United
States Constitution. 122 Subsequently, the City appealed the trial court's
decision to the Illinois Appellate Court, which affirmed the lower
court's ruling holding the Ordinance unconstitutional. 1
23
WHEREAS, Members of criminal street gangs avoid arrest by committing no offense pun-
ishable under existing laws when they know the police are present, while maintaining con-
trol over identifiable areas by continued loitering; and
WHEREAS, The City Council has determined that loitering in public places by criminal
street gang members creates a justifiable fear for the safety of persons and property in the
area because of the violence, drug-dealing and vandalism often associated with such activ-
ity; and
WHEREAS, The City also has an interest in discouraging all persons from loitering in pub-
lic places with criminal gang members; and
WHEREAS, Aggressive action is necessary to preserve the city's streets and other public
places so that the public may use such places without fear.
Id. (quoting CHICAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE § 8-4-015 (1992)).
118. See Robert Davis, Special Units to Police Loiterers, City Wants to Make New Anti-Gang
Law Hold Up in Court, CHI. TRIB., June 19, 1992, § 2, at 3; John Kass, Old Tactic Sought in
Crime War, CHI. TRIB., May 15, 1992, § 2, at 1. See generally Kevin Johnson, Chicago's New
Gang Ordinance Creates Concern, USA TODAY, July 8, 1992, at 5A.
119. See Poulos, supra note 18, at 384 n.26 (citing each of the trial court decisions).
120. See City of Chicago v. Youkhana, 660 N.E.2d 34, 37 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995), aff'd sub nom.
Morales Ill, 119 S. Ct. 1849 (1999).
121. See id. at 39.
122. See id. at 38. In addition, the trial court judge noted that the Ordinance was also over-
broad under Article 1, Section 5 of the Illinois Constitution. See id. at 39.
123. See id. at 36.
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1. The Illinois Appellate Court's Treatment of the Ordinance
The Illinois Appellate Court held that the Ordinance: (1) violated
First Amendment guarantees of freedom of association, assembly and
expression; 124 (2) violated due process rights because it was unconstitu-
tionally vague; 125 (3) unconstitutionally criminalized status; 126 and (4)
allowed arrests without probable cause in violation of the Fourth
Amendment.12
7
Based on its decision in City of Chicago v. Youkhana, the Illinois
Appellate Court consolidated and affirmed other pending appeals and
reversed defendant Morales's conviction, along with several others.
128
The City then appealed the consolidated cases to the Illinois Supreme
Court, which affirmed the appellate court's ruling. 1
29
2. The Illinois Supreme Court's Decision in Morales H
The Illinois Supreme Court also held the Ordinance unconstitutional
on the grounds that it violated due process of law because it was
"impermissibly vague on its face and [was] an arbitrary restriction on
personal liberties."' 130  Although the court found the Ordinance uncon-
stitutional on these grounds, it refused to opine on whether the Ordi-
nance violated First Amendment rights, criminalized status or permitted
124. See id. at 38. In City of Chicago v. Youkhana, the Appellate Court interpreted the Ordi-
nance to mean that even when only one gang member is mingling with "a group of innocent non-
gang members," all persons can be ordered to disperse, with the threat of arrest for failing to do
so. Id. The court noted, "this smacks of a police-state tactic and clearly violates the first amend-
ment rights of the innocent persons." Id.
125. See id. at 40-41 (holding that the Ordinance's failure to sufficiently define the term "loi-
ter" renders it void-for-vagueness in that it does not give reasonable people adequate notice of
what conduct is proscribed).
126. See id. at 42 (rejecting the City's argument that the Ordinance applies equally to all loi-
terers regardless of their status as a gang member). The court stated that once the Ordinance is
triggered it applies equally to all loiters; however, the Ordinance cannot be triggered unless a
gang member is present. See id. That is, the Ordinance "prohibits gang members from loitering
because they are gang members, not because they are loitering." Id. In reaching this conclusion,
the appellate court relied in part on Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), which held un-
constitutional a state statute making it a misdemeanor for anyone to be a drug addict. See Youk-
hana, 660 N.E.2d at 42 (citing Robinson, 370 U.S. at 666-67). The Supreme Court held that the
statute at issue in Robinson violated the Eighth Amendment's cruel and unusual punishment
clause. See Robinson, 370 U.S. at 667.
127. See Youkhana, 660 N.E.2d at 42 (holding that the Ordinance imperils the rights guaran-
teed under the Fourth Amendment, which allows police officers to arrest a party only when they
have probable cause that such party has committed a crime).
128. See City of Chicago v. Morales, Nos. 1-93-4039, et al. (Ill. App. Ct., Dec. 29, 1995)
[hereinafter "Morales r'j.
129. See Morales I, 687 N.E.2d 53, 57, 59 (111. 1997), affd, 119 S. Ct. 1849 (1999).
130. Id. at 59.
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arrests without probable cause. 131  The court limited its decision to
finding the Ordinance void-for-vagueness 132 and an infringement on
personal liberty interests, specifically the freedom of movement. 1
33
a. Void-For-Vagueness
The court found that the Ordinance failed to meet the two basic crite-
ria to satisfy the vagueness doctrine. 134  That is, the court first deter-
mined that the Ordinance was not sufficiently definite to give persons of
ordinary intellect reasonable opportunity to discern lawful conduct from
proscribed conduct. 135 Second, the Ordinance did not clearly define the
unlawful conduct in such a way that would not promote discriminatory
enforcement. 136
With respect to the first criterion, the court determined that the re-
quirement of adequate notice was absent in the Ordinance as drafted. 137
Specifically, the court found the Ordinance's definition of the term
"loiter"-"to remain in any one place with no apparent pur-
pose"138-unconstitutionally vague because it reached innocent, lawful
conduct and did not inform persons of the prohibited conduct. 139  Ac-
cording to the court, "people with entirely legitimate and lawful pur-
poses [would] not always be able to make their purpose apparent to an
observing police officer."' 14° Thus, the court explained that for such an
131. See id.
132. See id. at 63. For a discussion of the vagueness doctrine, see supra Part I.A. 1.
133. See Morales H, 687 N.E.2d at 65.
134. See id. at 60-61.
135. See id. at 60.
136. See id. at 61-62.
137. See id. at 63.
138. Id. at 61 (citing CHICAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE § 8-4-015 (1992)).
139. See id. The court noted that several other jurisdictions have similarly invalidated analo-
gous ordinances that failed to specify the type of proscribed conduct. See id. (citing United States
ex rel. Newsome v. Malcolm, 492 F.2d 1166 (2d Cir. 1974) (loitering without apparent purpose),
affid sub nom. Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U.S. 283 (1975); In re C.M., 630 P.2d 593 (Colo.
1981) (loitering without legitimate reason); People v. Berck, 300 N.E.2d 411 (N.Y. 1973) (loi-
tering without apparent reason)).
140. Morales 1!, 687 N.E.2d at 61. The City argued that even if the Ordinance language does
not clearly indicate to persons what conduct it prohibits, once a police officer gave an order to
disperse, adequate notice would then be apparent to persons of ordinary intelligence. See id. at
62. The court rejected this argument, stating that the refusal of a command to disperse does not
alleviate the vagueness in the Ordinance regarding what conduct elicited such a police command
in the first place. See id. The court asserted that this holding was consistent with its prior prece-
dent in City of Chicago v. Meyer, 253 N.E.2d 400 (Ill. 1969). See Morales 11, 687 N.E.2d at 62.
In Meyer, the Illinois Supreme Court held that police have the authority to arrest persons for fail-
ing to obey an order to cease "otherwise lawful conduct where they have made all reasonable ef-
forts to maintain order, but the conduct is producing an imminent threat of uncontrollable vio-
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ordinance to be held valid, the ordinance must connect loitering with a
second specific element of criminal conduct.' 41 The court found that
this Ordinance did not make the required connection. 1
42
The court also held that the second criterion of vagueness, the possi-
bility of arbitrary enforcement by police officers, was inherent in the
Ordinance. 143 Indeed, the court found that the Ordinance vested police
with almost unfettered discretion 14 in determining whether a suspect's
conduct violated the Ordinance. 145 As a result, the Ordinance illegiti-
mately conferred seemingly limitless power on police to arrest sus-
pected violators.' 46  Moreover, the court rejected the City's argument
that the General Order set forth the limits within which police could im-
plement the Ordinance. 147 The court observed that the responsibility for
establishing guidelines in the criminal law cannot be abdicated to law
enforcement officers in the field who would then be applying their own
subjective criteria when enforcing the Ordinance. 148
b. Infringement on Personal Liberty Interests
The court agreed with defendants that the Ordinance permitted arbi-
trary exercise of the City's police power in violation of substantive due
process.149  In rejecting the City's argument that the Ordinance in-
lence or riot." Meyer, 253 N.E.2d at 400.
141. See Morales H, 687 N.E.2d at 61; see also Arizona ex rel. Williams v. City Court, 520
P.2d 1166 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1974) (upholding an ordinance that prohibited loitering for purpose of
begging); People v. Superior Court, 758 P.2d 1046 (Cal. 1988) (upholding an ordinance prohib-
iting loitering to solicit lewd or unlawful act); State v. Armstrong, 162 N.W.2d 357 (Minn. 1968)
(upholding an ordinance that prohibited loitering with intent to solicit prostitution).
142. See Morales I1, 687 N.E.2d at 61.
143. See id. at 63.
144. See id. The court stated: "Where a criminal ordinance vests unfettered discretion in the
police to determine whether a suspect's conduct has violated the ordinance, it 'entrust[s] law-
making to the moment-to-moment judgment of the policeman on his beat."' Id. (quoting Smith v.
Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 575 (1974)).
145. See id.
146. See id.
147. See id. at 64. The court noted that although the Order attempts to set forth criteria for an
officer to determine whether a suspect is a member of a criminal gang, the Order "does absolutely
nothing to cure the imprecisions of the definition of the 'loitering' element of the crime." Id. In
fact, the court further explained, the Order expressly states that an officer may not establish that a
suspect is a criminal gang member based solely on the type of clothing he or she is wearing, if
such clothing would be available to the general public. See id. at 64 n.1; see also City of Chicago
v. Youkihana, 660 N.E.2d 34, 37 (11. App. Ct. 1995), affd sub nom. Morales 111, 119 S. Ct. 1849
(1999). Nevertheless, this is exactly the basis upon which defendant Morales was arrested, thus
demonstrating the susceptibility of the Order to arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. See
Morales H, 687 N.E.2d at 64 n. 1.
148. See Morales 11, 687 N.E.2d at 64.
149. See id.
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fringed upon no constitutionally protected activity, the court relied upon
the United States Supreme Court's decision in Papachristou v. City of
Jacksonville. 1
50
As stated above, 151 the Supreme Court noted in Papachristou that
although not expressly mentioned in the United States Constitution, ac-
tivities such as loafing, night walking and loitering are part of the
amenities of life. 152 The Illinois Supreme Court found that the activities
at issue under the Ordinance and the activities in Papachristou were
analogous and, relying on established legal precedent, held that such
harmless activity "is an aspect of the personal liberties protected by the
due process clause." 153 The court concluded that the Chicago Ordi-
nance infringed upon the general right to travel, 154 the right of freedom
of movement 155 and the general right to associate with others. 156  Ac-
cordingly, the Illinois Supreme Court declined to give the Ordinance a
limiting construction that would have enabled it to declare the Ordi-
nance valid in its application. 157 Therefore, the United States Supreme
Court, in its review, was obliged to construe the Ordinance no more nar-
rowly than the highest court of the state.
158
III. DISCUSSION
On June 10, 1999, the United States Supreme Court decided Morales
111.159 This decision affirmed the Illinois Supreme Court's decision,
which held the Ordinance void-for-vagueness. 16° Despite the clear ne-
cessity to address the City's valid concerns, the Supreme Court found
the application of the City Council's Ordinance impermissibly vague
and both arbitrary and discriminatory in enforcement. 161 Specifically,
in a six to three decision, 162 the Court's majority held the Chicago Anti-
150. See id. (citing Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972)).
151. See supra Part ll.B.2 (analyzing the Supreme Court's decision in Papachristou).
152. See Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 164.
153. Morales 11, 687 N.E.2d at 64.
154. See id. at 65 (citing Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629 (1969)).
155. See id. (citing Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983)).
156. See id. (citing Swank v. Smart, 898 F.2d 1247, 1252 (7th Cir. 1990)).
157. See id. at 63.
158. See Morales Ill, 119 S. Ct. 1849, 1861 n.31 (1999) (citing Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312,
329-30 (1988), which determined that although the statute at issue, if literally read, could have
been deemed void-for-vagueness, the court of appeals had provided a limiting construction that
alleviated this problem).
159. See id. at 1849.
160. See id. at 1856.
161. See id. at 1860-61.
162. See id. at 1853. Despite the six to three vote, the Court was very splintered. Justice Ste-
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Gang Loitering Ordinance unconstitutionally vague because the Ordi-
nance's definition of loitering-"to remain in any one place with no ap-
parent purpose" 163-gave police officers too much discretion to deter-
mine what constituted loitering. 164  Despite the six to three vote,
however, there was little agreement among the Justices regarding fun-
damental liberty interests in connection with loitering activities. 165
A. A Narrow Holding by the Majority
The only issue that elicited agreement in the majority was that the
"broad sweep of the [O]rdinance 'violate[d] the requirement that a leg-
islature establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement." ' 166
All six Justices in the majority agreed that the Ordinance's language
conferred vast discretion upon police to enforce the law in an arbitrary
and discriminatory manner. 167 The majority, acknowledging that the
Illinois Supreme Court's interpretation of the language was consistent
with its findings, 168 held that the Ordinance was unconstitutionally
vague in that it failed to clearly define the proscribed behavior. 169
1. Insufficient Limitations on Discretion
The City argued that the Illinois Supreme Court's interpretation of
the Ordinance was erroneous in three ways. First, the Ordinance did not
allow a police officer to issue a dispersal order to those persons who had
vens wrote the opinion of the Court. However, Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and Breyer each
wrote separate concurring opinions and did not join Part III (acknowledging the freedom to loiter
for innocent purposes as part of the liberty interests protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment), Part IV (holding that the Ordinance failed to give citizens of ordinary
intelligence notice of what conduct was proscribed), and Part VI (finding the Ordinance did not
meet constitutional standards for definiteness and clarity and therefore making it unnecessary to
determine whether the Ordinance is unconstitutional as a deprivation of substantive due process)
of the Court's opinion. Justices Scalia and Thomas each wrote dissenting opinions. Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Scalia joined Justice Thomas's dissenting opinion. See id.
163. Id. at 1854 n.2 (citing CHICAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE § 8-4-015(c)(1) (1992)).
164. See id. at 1861-62.
165. See infra Part III.B (discussing the portion of Justice Stevens's opinion that acknowl-
edged the freedom to loiter for innocent purposes as part of the liberty protected by the Due Proc-
ess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
166. Morales II1, 119 S. Ct. at 1861 (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983)).
167. See id. at 1861-62.
168. See id. at 1861. The majority recognized that it had no authority to interpret the language
of this Ordinance more narrowly than the highest court of the State of Illinois. See id.; see also
Smiley v. Kansas, 196 U.S. 447, 455 (1905) (stating "[tlhe power.., to determine the meaning of
a ... statute carries with it the power to prescribe its extent and limitations as well as the method
by which they shall be determined").
169. See Morales 111, 119 S. Ct. at 1862.
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an apparent purpose. 170  Second, there was no violation of the Ordi-
nance if individuals obeyed the Order. 171 Third, a police officer could
not issue a dispersal order if none of the loiterers were street gang
members.' 72 The majority rejected each of these arguments as insuffi-
cient, noting that the mandatory language of the Ordinance required a
police officer "to issue an order without first making any inquiry about
their possible purposes."' 173 The Court explained that the mere fact that
there was no inquiry regarding a person's purpose caused the Ordinance
to criminalize even innocent and lawful behavior. 174 Furthermore, the
Court also stated the fact that an order to disperse must be disobeyed be-
fore a violation of the Ordinance occurred was immaterial because it did
not provide the police officer with any guidance regarding whether a
dispersal order should be issued in the first place. 175 As the Court hy-
pothesized, "[i]t matters not whether the reason that a gang member and
his father ... might loiter near Wrigley Field is to rob an unsuspecting
fan or just to get a glimpse of Sammy Sosa leaving the ballpark."' 176
Under both circumstances, the Ordinance would mandate that an officer
order the individuals to disperse.
177
2. Subjective Standard Without Further Limitation is Impermissible
According to the Court, the Ordinance's definition of loitering-"to
remain in any one place with no apparent purpose"178-created an in-
herently subjective standard for police officers when enforcing the
law. 179 The Court explained that this standard was subjective because it
may not be clear to the officer what apparent purpose a bystander may
have; yet it may seem perfectly clear to the bystander that his conduct
conveys his purpose. 180 The Court particularly noted that although a
bystander's conduct may be completely innocent, the Ordinance re-
quired dispersal, even for harmless conduct. 18 1
170. See id. at 1861.
171. See id.
172. See id.
173. Id.
174. See id.
175. See id.
176. Id.
177. See id.
178. Id. at 1854 n.2 (citing CHICAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE § 8-4-015 (1992)).
179. See id. at 1862. The vast discretion conferred upon police in this Ordinance stems from
the definition of "loitering." See id. at 1861.
180. See id. at 1862.
181. See id. Since issuing an order to disperse is left to the subjective determination of an of-
ficer, most idlers would be unaware that their actions were proscribed. See id. Furthermore, as
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The requirement that a police officer reasonably believe that one of
the loiterers be a gang member, the Court stated, placed no limitation on
the officer's authority to issue a dispersal order. 182 The Court did point
out that if the Ordinance's definition of loitering contained an additional
element of harmful conduct, 183 then such reasonable belief may provide
an adequate limitation on police authority. 184 The Court explained that
in the absence of such an additional element, however, the term "loiter,"
as defined, was impermissibly vague and left the Ordinance susceptible
to arbitrary enforcement.185
B. Plurality'86 Opinion Finds a Protected Liberty Interest in Freedom
to Loiter for Innocent Purposes
Only three Justices 187 concluded that the freedom to loiter for inno-
cent purposes was a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 188  The plurality expressly recognized
this "right to remove from one place to another according to inclination"
as "an attribute of personal liberty."' 189 The plurality reached this con-
clusion by relying on that part of Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville
that extolled the virtues of walking, strolling and wandering as historic
the Court hypothesized, "[p]resumably an officer would have discretion to treat some purposes-
perhaps a purpose to engage in idle conversation or simply to enjoy a cool breeze on a warm eve-
ning-as too frivolous to be apparent if he suspected a different ulterior motive." Id. In addition,
an overly eager officer, knowledgeable of the City's concern for gang violence, may ignore the
text of the Ordinance and issue a dispersal order, despite evidence of an actual, illicit purpose.
See id.
182. See id.
183. See id.; see also Arizona ex rel. Williams v. City Court, 520 P.2d 1168 (Ariz. App. Ct.
1974) (upholding an ordinance that prohibited loitering for purpose of begging); People v. Supe-
rior Court, 758 P.2d 1046 (Cal. 1988) (upholding an ordinance prohibiting loitering to solicit a
lewd or unlawful act); State v. Armstrong, 162 N.W.2d 357 (Minn. 1968) (upholding an ordi-
nance that prohibited loitering with intent to solicit prostitution).
184. See Morales /11, 119 S. Ct. at 1862. In addition, if the Ordinance applied only to persons
reasonably believed to be criminal gang members and did not apply to those merely in the pres-
ence of a suspected gang member, then maybe such a limitation would appropriately curb police
discretion. See id.
185. See id. at 1862-63.
186. This author follows the dissenting Justices in their use of the term "plurality" to describe
those portions of the opinion, which were authored by Justice Stevens and joined only by Justices
Ginsburg and Souter. See id. at 1872 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
187. Justice Stevens, the opinion's author, was joined by Justices Ginsburg and Souter in the
portion of the opinion recognizing the freedom to loiter for innocent purposes as a protected lib-
erty interest. See id. at 1854. In fact, Justices Ginsburg and Souter were the only other Justices
signing on to the Court's opinion in its entirety. See id.
188. See id. at 1857.
189. Id. (quoting Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270, 274 (1900)).
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amenities of life. 19° Moreover, in response to the City's citation to his-
torical precedent against recognizing loitering as a fundamental right, 9 '
the Court's plurality noted that although anti-loitering ordinances may
have a long history in American heritage, such "does not ensure their
constitutionality."' 192 Accordingly, the plurality juxtaposed a liberty in-
terest in freedom to loiter with the fundamental right to freedom of
movement historically recognized by the Court. 193
Despite its recognition of this fundamental liberty interest, the plural-
ity did not find that the Ordinance reached constitutionally protected
First Amendment rights. 194 Because the term "loiter" is defined as re-
maining in one place "with no apparent purpose,"' 95 the plurality con-
tended that "it is also clear that [the Ordinance] does not prohibit any
190. See Morales I1, 119 S. Ct. at 1857 (citing Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S.
156, 164 (1972)). In Papachristou, the Court noted that activities such as walking, strolling and
wandering are "historically part of the amenities of life as we have known them." Papachristou,
405 U.S. at 164. Even though these amenities are not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution,
"[t]hese unwritten amenities have been in part responsible for giving our people the feeling of
independence and self-confidence .... These amenities have dignified the right of dissent and
have honored the right to be non-conformists and the fight to defy submissiveness." Id.
191. See, e.g., Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972) (holding the First Amendment guar-
anty of free speech simply does not encompass a claim of right to remain in any particular place
on public thoroughfares-even if an individual's intent is to speak to another person). The de-
fendant in Colten was convicted of disorderly conduct because he attempted to intercede with a
police officer on behalf of a friend who was receiving a traffic ticket and failed to obey a police
order to move on. See id. at 106-07. The Colten Court held that there was no question that the
defendant's conduct, refusing to move on after being ordered, was not protected by the First
Amendment. See id. at 109. The Court's holding, however, was limited by the Kentucky court
that had interpreted the statute so as to confine its reach. See id. at 111. As construed by the
Kentucky court, the statute was violated "only where there [was] no bona fide intention to exer-
cise a constitutional right." Id.; see also City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19 (1989) (uphold-
ing an ordinance that regulated youth dances in such a way that it prevented older persons from
attending dances with younger ones). In Stanglin, the Court rejected the assertion that the Con-
stitution recognized a sweeping right of social association and determined that the ordinance did
not impinge upon any constitutionally protected right. See Stanglin, 490 U.S. at 25.
192. Morales 111, 119 S. Ct. at 1857 n.20.
193. See id. at 1857-58 ("It is apparent that an individual's decision to remain in a public
place of his choice is as much a part of his liberty as the freedom of movement inside frontiers
that is 'a part of our heritage."') (citation omitted).
194. See id. The First Amendment freedoms implicated with a loitering ordinance generally
include the freedoms of assembly and association. See generally Brief for Respondent, Morales
11, 119 S. Ct. 1849 (1999) (No. 97-1121), available in 1998 WL 614302. "It is hardly a contro-
versial proposition that laws that interfere with citizens' peaceful enjoyment of public streets,
sidewalks, and parks directly implicate all of the closely allied First Amendment rights of speech,
assembly, and association." Id. at *53-54. In particular, respondent's brief cited Coates v. City of
Cincinnati as an example of a loitering ordinance that directly implicated the right of assembly.
See id.; see also supra Part II.B. 1 (discussing Coates v. City of Cincinnati).
195. Morales II1, 119 S. Ct. at 1854 n.2 (providing the Ordinance's definition of "loiter")
(quoting CHICAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE § 8-4-015 (1992)).
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form of conduct that is apparently intended to convey a message."' 196
Thus, the plurality asserted that pursuant to the language of the Ordi-
nance, it is inapplicable to "assemblies that are designed to demonstrate
[their] support of, or opposition to, a particular point of view. 19 7
Moreover, the plurality stated that the impact the Ordinance may cause
"on the social contact between gang members and others does not im-
pair the First Amendment 'right of association."1 98
C. Dissenting Opinions Find No Vagueness in Ordinance
The Morales III decision elicited two strongly worded dissenting
opinions by Justices Scalia and Thomas. 199 Justice Scalia asserted that
the majority struck down a clearly reasonable ordinance and further dis-
agreed with the plurality's 20 recognition of a constitutionally guaran-
196. Id. at 1857.
197. Id.
198. Id. (citing City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 23-25 (1989)). There were also three
concurring opinions in Morales IH. Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice Breyer in her concurring
opinion, concluded that the Ordinance was void-for-vagueness due to its inadequate standards to
guide law enforcement officials in administering the Ordinance and its failure to clearly define
what conduct was proscribed. See id. at 1863-65 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concur-
ring in the judgment). Therefore, because this vagueness alone was sufficient to hold the Ordi-
nance unconstitutional, Justice O'Connor declined to address the other issues addressed by the
plurality, such as whether there is a fundamental liberty interest in innocent loitering and whether
the Ordinance impinged upon any First Amendment freedoms. See id. at 1864 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Nevertheless, Justice O'Connor proceeded to
indicate how future courts may be able to legitimately uphold a similar ordinance by providing a
narrowing construction at a lower court level. See id. at 1864-65 (O'Connor, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment). In addition, Justice O'Connor indicated that a similar ordi-
nance may avoid vagueness arguments if the ordinance required the act of loitering to be coupled
with an additional element of criminal conduct. See id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment). For example, a void-for-vagueness argument could have been
avoided if the Illinois Supreme Court had interpreted the term "loiter" to include remaining in any
one place with the intent to intimidate others from entering the area or for the purpose of con-
cealing illegal activity. See id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
On the other hand, in his concurrence, Justice Breyer determined that the Ordinance was un-
constitutional, not because it provided insufficient notice, but because the Ordinance did not pro-
vide sufficient minimal standards to guide law enforcement authorities in their application of the
Ordinance. See id. at 1866 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
Justice Kennedy, in a very limited concurring opinion, concluded that "[a]s interpreted by the
Illinois Supreme Court, the... [O]rdinance would reach a broad range of innocent conduct." Id.
at 1865 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Justice Kennedy, how-
ever, did not expand upon what exactly the nature of such innocent conduct would encompass.
See id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Therefore, it is unclear
whether Justice Kennedy would find that such innocent conduct included any First Amendment
freedoms.
199. See Morales I11, 119 S. Ct. at 1867 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 1879 (Thomas, J., dis-
senting).
200. Justice Scalia, in his dissent, continually referred to the "majority's" finding of a consti-
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol. 31
teed freedom to loiter for innocent purposes. 201 On the other hand, Jus-
tice Thomas, in his dissent, opined on the social decline in city neigh-
borhoods, the national tragedy caused by criminal gangs and the reason-
ableness of the Ordinance enacted by the City of Chicago in
response. 202 Justice Thomas concluded that the Ordinance was not
vague and did not violate due process because the freedom to loiter for
innocent purposes is not a liberty interest traditionally recognized in our
nation's history.
20 3
Similar to Justice Thomas, Justice Scalia attacked the plurality's
finding of a constitutionally protected right to loiter.20 4  Justice Scalia
asserted that the plurality recklessly used the term "constitutional right"
in the absence of the "slightest evidence" supporting a constitutional
right to loiter. 20 5  Indeed, Justice Scalia found no historical underpin-
nings in our nation's history that would support the finding of such a
fundamental liberty interest.20 6  Justice Scalia further asserted that the
plurality ignored the established method for due process analysis by not
"carefully and narrowly describing the asserted right, and then examin-
ing whether that right is manifested in '[o]ur Nation's history, legal tra-
ditions and practices." 20 7
Next, Justice Scalia assailed the majority's conclusion that the Ordi-
nance was constitutionally vague because it lacked the requisite speci-
tutional right to loiter. See id. at 1867 (Scalia, J., dissenting). However, only Justices Ginsburg
and Souter joined that part of Justice Stevens's opinion that discussed such a finding. See id. at
1856-57. In fact, neither Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, nor Breyer's concurring opinions explic-
itly accepted the proposition that there was a constitutionally protected freedom in the right to
loiter. See id. Accordingly, where Justice Scalia referred to the "majority" in connection with the
fundamental right to loiter, this author has instead referred to it as the plurality.
201. See id. at 1867 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
202. See id. at 1879-81 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
203. See id. at 1879 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
204. See id. at 1872 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia quoted the plurality's description of
the constitutional right at issue as the right to "remain in a public place of his choice." Id. (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
205. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
206. See id. at 1872-73 (Scalia, J., dissenting). "It is simply not maintainable that the right to
loiter would have been regarded as an essential attribute of liberty at the time of the framing or at
the time of adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
207. Id. at 1873 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-
21 (1997)). Justice Scalia stated that this established method of analyzing due process claims is a
limitation on the Court's recognition of new liberty interests. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Jus-
tice Scalia contended "[tihe plurality opinion not only ignores this necessary limitation, but it
leaps far beyond any substantive-due-process atrocity we have ever committed, by actually plac-
ing the burden of proof upon the defendant to establish that loitering is not a 'fundamental lib-
erty."' Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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ficity to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. 20 8 Justice
Scalia asserted that the dispersal order at issue under the Ordinance
"could hardly be clearer." 2°9 Specifically, he argued that the require-
ment that police officers "'reasonably believ[e]' that one of the group to
which the order [was] issued [was] a 'criminal gang member"' suffi-
ciently resembled probable cause, eliminating the possibility of arbitrary
or discriminatory enforcement. 210
Justice Thomas, in his dissenting opinion, forcefully argued the pub-
lic policy reasons for upholding the Ordinance and elaborated upon the
"human costs exacted by criminal street gangs." 211 Justice Thomas ar-
gued that the majority's holding rebuffed the well-established principle
that the police have the authority and duty to disperse those persons
who are gathered in such a way as to threaten the public peace. 212 In
addition, Justice Thomas rejected both the plurality's conclusion that
the Ordinance was constitutionally invalid because it infringed upon the
constitutional right to loiter and the majority's conclusion that the Ordi-
nance was vague on its face. 213
Like Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas contended that the freedom to
loiter, recognized by the plurality, was not deeply rooted in our nation's
history, legal traditions or practices. 214 To the contrary, Justice Thomas
explained that only laws that invade fundamental rights and liberties af-
front the Due Process Clause and are therefore unconstitutional.215
Moreover, Justice Thomas asserted that the plurality's decision sacri-
fices the rights of law-abiding citizens to live in safe neighborhoods,
while guaranteeing that gang members have the constitutionally pro-
tected right to loiter freely.216
IV. ANALYSIS
The majority in Morales III found that the Ordinance was void-for-
vagueness because "[t]he broad sweep of the [O]rdinance... violate[d]
'the requirement that a legislature establish minimal guidelines to gov-
208. See id. at 1876 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
209. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
210. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
211. Id. at 1879 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
212. See id. at 1881 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
213. See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
214. See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
215. See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21
(1997)).
216. See id. at 1880-81 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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ern law enforcement."' 217 As a result, the majority asserted that the Or-
dinance, pursuant to the General Order, was an insufficient limitation on
the discretionary authority endowed in the police218 and will inevitably
lead to arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. The majority, in lim-
iting its holding to this narrow branch of the void-for-vagueness doc-
trine, failed to appreciate the broad reach that this type of ordinance has
in affecting certain constitutionally protected rights. 219  Indeed, the
Morales III Court's narrow ruling has neglected to adequately protect
one of our Nation's most cherished freedoms, the freedom of assem-
bly. 220
A. Failure to Invoke the Overbreadth Doctrine
The plurality, and presumably the majority in light of its silence, have
failed to recognize the reach of the language in this Ordinance. 221 Spe-
cifically, the Court declined to rely upon the overbreadth doctrine in
evaluating this Ordinance because it believed that no First Amendment
rights were implicated.222 An ordinance that prohibits loitering for no
apparent purpose, however, clearly encompasses the type of conduct
that is contemplated in our First Amendment freedoms. 223  As the
Court's majority acknowledges, it may be impossible for a casual ob-
server to determine what an individual's purpose may be in remaining
217. Id. at 1861 (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983)).
218. See id. at 1861-62. Moreover, the Court found that the City Council's findings failed to
indicate why the Ordinance should apply to non-gang members if the source of the evil that they
were trying to combat is criminal gang activity. See id. at 1862.
219. See id. at 1857. The plurality refused to apply the overbreadth doctrine because it con-
tended that the Ordinance did not have a "sufficiently substantial impact on conduct protected by
the First Amendment." Id. Arguably, however, an overbreadth analysis is warranted in this case
because such an analysis "measures how enactments that prohibit conduct fit with the universe of
constitutionally protected conduct." City of Tacoma v. Luvene, 827 P.2d 1374, 1381 (Wash.
1992). In the instant case, where the prohibited conduct is the gathering of individuals for no ap-
parent purpose, it is appropriate to investigate how an ordinance prohibiting such conduct inter-
feres with constitutional freedoms. It is this analysis that the Court failed to undertake.
220. See Morales 111, 119 S. Ct. at 1857 (noting that the Ordinance, by its terms, is "inappli-
cable to assemblies that are designed to demonstrate a group's -support of, or opposition to, a par-
ticular point of view").
221. See id. ("Because the term 'loiter' is defined as remaining in one place with 'no apparent
purpose,' it is also clear that it does not prohibit any form of conduct that is apparently intended
to convey a message."). The plurality also asserts that the Ordinance's "impact on the social
contact between gang members and others does not impair the First Amendment 'right of asso-
ciation' as previously recognized by the Court. Id. (citing Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 23-25
(1989)).
222. See id. at 1867.
223. See supra notes 188-98 (discussing First Amendment freedoms and their relation to loi-
tering ordinances).
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idle on a street corner. 224 Likewise, it would be impossible for an ob-
server to determine whether or not an individual's action or inaction it-
self was intended to convey a message. 225 Moreover, the goals this Or-
dinance sought to accomplish could easily have been achieved through
the use of laws then existing,226 instead of promulgating a law that
criminalized conduct protected under the First Amendment. 227
The Illinois Appellate Court appropriately recognized the ramifica-
tions of the Ordinance when it stated that the "ordinance clearly reaches
conduct that the government has no business prohibiting." 228 Even
without an explicit constitutional guarantee to stand in one place with
no apparent purpose, it seems inconceivable that the government should
be permitted to regulate harmless conduct. 229  If the Constitution pro-
tects the freedom of expression, it is likely that it equally protects an in-
dividual's or a group's freedom to remain in one place and abstain from
any manner of expression whatsoever, which, in and of itself, is a form
of expression.230
In addition, when the Supreme Court analyzed the Ordinance for in-
fringement of First Amendment rights, it failed to properly rely on
precedent such as Coates v. City of Cincinnati.231 The ordinance impli-
cated in Coates was virtually indistinguishable from the Ordinance in
224. See Morales I11, 119 S. Ct. at 1861-62 ("The 'no apparent purpose' standard for making
that decision [whether to issue a dispersal order] is inherently subjective because its application
depends on whether some purpose is 'apparent' to the officer on the scene.").
225. See id. at 1856 n.14.
226. The City of Chicago has numerous laws, currently in effect, which may be utilized to
promote safety in troubled neighborhoods. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/12-6 (West
1998) (Intimidation); see also 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/25-1 (West 1998) (Mob Action);
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 570/405.2 (West 1998 & Supp. 1999) (Streetgang Criminal Drug
Conspiracy); 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 147/1-35 (West 1998 & Supp. 1999) (Illinois Street-
gang Terrorism Omnibus Prevention Act). Several of these existing laws appear to address pre-
cisely the type of conduct that the Ordinance also seeks to combat.
227. See Morales 111, 119 S. Ct. at 1854 n.2 (providing the relevant portions of the Ordinance)
(citing CHICAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE § 8-4-015 (1992)).
228. City of Chicago v. Youkhana, 660 N.E.2d 34, 38 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995), aff'd sub nom.
Morales I11, 119 S. Ct. 1849 (1999).
229. See U.S. Sup. Ct. Official Transcript at *52, Morales 111, 119 S. Ct. 1854 (1999) (No.
97), available in 1998 WL 873033. In oral argument before the United States Supreme Court,
Harvey Grossman, on behalf of Respondent Morales, stated "[i]f you try to regulate conduct in a
public forum on the streets, on the sidewalks, in our parks ... I think that you have to understand
that you will sweep within it not simply hanging out, but a multitude of human activity that this
Court would give protection to." Id.
230. See Youkhana, 660 N.E.2d at 38 ("Standing in one place with no apparent purpose can-
not be made a crime, just as assembling on the sidewalks in a manner annoying to passersby
could not be made a crime in Coates.") (citation omitted).
231. Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971).
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the instant case, 232 yet the Court completely failed to analogize Coates
and utilize an overbreadth analysis. 2
33
Specifically, in 1971, the Coates Court held that a Cincinnati ordi-
nance violated the right of free assembly and association.234  These
same rights were undoubtedly violated by the Chicago Ordinance and
are no less worthy of protection in 1999 than they were in 1971.235 Had
the Court juxtaposed the two ordinances, it would have been clear that
the behavior proscribed in the Chicago Ordinance, loitering for no ap-
parent purpose,236 and the conduct proscribed in Coates, annoying be-
havior,237 each similarly offend the freedoms of assembly and associa-
tion.238 By not utilizing a strict overbreadth analysis, the Court failed in
its responsibilities to protect the essence of the United States Constitu-
tion and its citizens' freedoms.
B. Finding Little Support for a Fundamental Liberty Interest
Although the Court neglectfully dismissed the implications for the
freedom of association that are clearly affected by an ordinance of this
nature, the plurality found a fundamental liberty interest in the right to
loiter for innocent purposes.239 The Court, however, missed an oppor-
tunity to pick up where its predecessors left off in 1972 with the ruling
in Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville.240 The Court made its decision
in Papachristou without undertaking a substantive analysis of why in-
nocent loitering should be a constitutionally protected individual liberty
232. See supra notes 86-91 and accompanying text (discussing the ordinance at issue in
Coates). The ordinance in Coates required that "if three or more people meet together on a side-
walk or street comer, they must conduct themselves so as not to annoy any police officer or other
person." Coates, 402 U.S. at 614. The Coates Court noted that it is clearly within the power of a
city to enact an ordinance that prevents people "from blocking sidewalks, obstructing traffic...
or engaging in countless other forms of antisocial conduct ... [however] [i]t cannot constitution-
ally do so through the enactment and enforcement of an ordinance whose violation may entirely
depend upon whether or not a policeman is annoyed." Id.
233. See Morales II, 119 S. Ct. at 1857 (establishing the plurality's decision not to analyze
the Ordinance under the overbreadth doctrine).
234. See Coates, 402 U.S. at 615.
235. See Youkhana, 660 N.E.2d at 38 (holding that "the Ordinance clearly implicates the first
amendment rights of assembly, association, and expression").
236. See Morales 111, 119 S. Ct. at 1854 n.2 (setting forth the definition of "loiter" as provided
in the Ordinance) (citing CHICAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE § 8-4-015 (1992)).
237. See Coates, 402 U.S. at 611 (citing CINCINNATI, OHIO, CODE OF ORDINANCES § 901-L6
(1956)).
238. See Youkhana, 660 N.E.2d at 38.
239. See Morales 11, 119 S. Ct. at 1857.
240. See supra Part l.B.2 (discussing Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville).
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interest. 241 Rather than building on Papachristou, Justice Stevens made
only a passing reference to the Papachristou case and neglected to go
forward with the requisite analysis necessary to garner the majority's
support for recognizing a fundamental liberty interest in the right to in-
nocently "loiter." 242
Moreover, in recognizing a fundamental liberty interest, the plurality
completely ignored the standards set forth in its earlier decision in
Washington v. Glucksberg,243 regarding the process that must be ad-
hered to in finding a fundamental liberty interest.244 Indeed, in light of
Glucksberg and that Court's strict test for finding a fundamental liberty
interest, 245 the Court should have equated the conduct prohibited in the
Ordinance with an infringement upon constitutionally protected First
Amendment freedoms. 246  As Justice Thomas explained in his dissent,
the plurality noted that loitering laws had been a part of American his-
tory, yet they nevertheless swept this history aside and found that such a
liberty should be protected by the Due Process Clause.247 Indeed, only
three of the six Justices in the majority signed on to that portion of the
opinion that found a fundamental liberty interest in the freedom to loiter
for innocent purposes.24
8
Clearly, if strictly applied, even an ordinance the Court does not find
to be constitutionally vague still runs the risk of deterring the freedoms
individuals should enjoy pursuant to their First Amendment rights. 249
That is, the Court runs the risk of upholding an ordinance as constitu-
tional even if some residents will have to sacrifice their freedom to loi-
241. See supra Part H.B.2.
242. See Morales I, 119 S. Ct. at 1857. "We have expressly identified this 'right to remove
from one place to another according to inclination' as 'an attribute of personal liberty' protected
by the Constitution." Id. (quoting Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270, 274 (1900), and citing Pa-
pachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 164 (1972)).
243. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
244. See id. at 720-21; see also supra note 207 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's
method for recognizing a new fundamental liberty interest under due process).
245. See Morales 111, 119 S. Ct. at 1881 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Glucksberg, 521 U.S.
at 720-21) (reiterating the Court's earlier holding in Glucksberg which stated that in order for a
law to infringe upon a fundamental liberty, that liberty must be part of our "'Nation's history and
tradition"').
246. See supra note 36 (providing relevant text of the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution).
247. See Morales II1, 119 S. Ct. at 1881-83 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
248. See supra Part II.B (discussing the views of the plurality).
249. See generally Brief for Respondent at *53-68, Morales 111, 119 S. Ct. 1849 (1999) (No.
97-1121), available in 1998 WL 614302 (discussing how the Ordinance is overly broad and
therefore violative of the First Amendment).
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ter.250 Although Justice Scalia argued that this is a decision that should
be left to the community, 251 others may argue, and this author would
agree, that infringement of any constitutionally protected freedom is
impermissible.25
2
C. Passing Constitutional Muster
Although the Morales III Court declared the Ordinance unconstitu-
tional, certain Justices also indicated that, with minor revisions, a simi-
lar ordinance may be able to survive constitutional scrutiny in the fu-
ture.253  Although Justice O'Connor's opinion made specific reference
to suggested language,254 as the dissent points out, that language ap-
pears to be equally vague.255 Any city attempting to draft a law it be-
lieves could pass constitutional muster will inevitably be walking a fine
line between one that the Court would find unconstitutionally vague and
one that it would not. 25
6
It is disconcerting that this Court so readily dismissed the notion that
any First Amendment freedoms are implicated in this type of ordi-
nance.257 Although there is little argument that American cities are
faced with numerous difficulties stemming from gang activity, neither
250. See Morales 111, 119 S. Ct. at 1867 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (asserting that it is within a
citizen's rights to decide whether it is worth restricting some of her freedom in order to eliminate
the problems that plague her community).
251. See id. at 1877 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
252. This position is distinguished in the instant case, in that the dissent in Morales III did not
find that innocent loitering is a constitutionally protected freedom. See id. at 1867 (Scalia, J., dis-
senting). The plurality, however, asserted that there is such a constitutionally guaranteed right
worthy of protection. See id. at 1857; see also Robert S. Greenberger, Antiloitering Law is De-
clared Unconstitutional, WALL ST. J., June 11, 1999, at B8 (noting that "in many crime-plagued
areas, there is an inherent tension between the freedom to assemble and the rights of citizens to
live securely and safely in their neighborhoods").
253. See Morales 111, 119 S. Ct. at 1860-61 (noting that an ordinance may not be unconstitu-
tionally vague if its definition of loitering clearly defined the conduct that was forbidden); see
also id. at 1864 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Justice
O'Connor asserted that an ordinance's vagueness may be cured if it "applied only to persons rea-
sonably believed to be gang members" because it "would have directed the manner in which the
order was issued by specifying to whom the order could be issued." Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment).
254. See supra notes 198, 253 (discussing language suggested by Justice O'Connor).
255. See Morales 111, 119 S. Ct. at 1878-79 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (suggesting that if the Court
finds the current ordinance language vague, the Court would likely find similar vagueness prob-
lems in the language proffered by Justice O'Connor to cure the Ordinance's constitutional short-
comings).
256. See supra Part II.B (discussing the modem treatment of loitering laws in the United
States).
257. See supra Part IV.A (discussing the Morales III Court's failure to find the implication of
any First Amendment freedoms).
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this Court, nor the American people, should permit a "chipping away"
of any of our First Amendment freedoms. 258  The Court's inability to
reach consensus on the issue of an individual liberty interest in innocent
loitering and its lack of recognition of First Amendment implications
denotes serious concern for the future of our most basic freedoms.
259
In fact, Justice Scalia, in his dissent, dismissed the implications of the
Ordinance when he asserted that the Ordinance places only a "minor
limitation upon the free state of nature." 26
°
The Court appears to have provided a guideline for lawmakers in
drafting similar ordinances that would eliminate some of the defects that
afflicted the Chicago Ordinance, particularly, those concerning notice,
police discretion and vagueness in the Ordinance's definition of the
term "loiter." 261 An ordinance, however, cured of these defects may, by
its very nature, potentially infringe on certain First Amendment free-
doms, which this Court has failed to recognize. 262  Because the Court
may not construe an ordinance any more narrowly than the highest court
of a state, the responsibility initially lies with the Illinois Supreme Court
which, importantly, did not determine whether the Ordinance impinged
upon any First Amendment rights.263 The Illinois Supreme Court and
others that follow should not avoid these First Amendment issues by
falling back on a less stringent void-for-vagueness analysis. The re-
sponsibility to protect individual freedoms begins with the courts of
each state.
258. See Thomas L. Doerr, Jr., Note, A Failed Attempt to Take Back Our Streets -A Constitu-
tional Triumph For Gangs: City of Chicago v. Morales, 82 MARQ. L. REV. 447, 449 (1999) (dis-
cussing the fine line lawmakers must walk in order to draft an ordinance that is neither vague nor
an infringement upon personal liberties).
259. The Illinois Supreme Court has not given the Ordinance such a narrow construction "as
to remove the seeming threat or deterrence to constitutionally protected expression." Broadrick v.
Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973). The courts, with respect to this Ordinance, have failed to
acknowledge the potential deterrent effect an ordinance of this type may have on those wishing to
exercise, inter alia, their constitutionally protected freedom of assembly.
260. Morales I11, 119 S. Ct. at 1867 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
261. See supra note 198 (discussing the concurrence's suggested changes in language to en-
able the Ordinance to pass constitutional scrutiny).
262. See supra notes 173-85 and accompanying text (discussing objectionable language in the
Ordinance).
263. See Morales H, 687 N.E.2d 53, 65 (Ill. 1997) (finding the Ordinance violated substantive
due process and therefore deeming it unnecessary to determine whether the Ordinance violated
the First Amendment right "of expressive association or the fundamental right of intimate asso-
ciation, both of which [would] command a much higher level of scrutiny"), affd, 119 S. Ct. 1849
(1999).
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In fact, one state court, in State v. Rucker, 264 recently distinguished
the "no apparent purpose" language in the Chicago Ordinance from a
Kansas statute that utilized the phrase "no legitimate purpose" in a
stalking law. In Rucker, pursuant to state statute, law enforcement offi-
cials were permitted to determine whether a suspect's conduct consti-
tuted "harassment," which the statute defined as "no legitimate pur-
pose." 265  The Kansas Supreme Court held that the phrase "no
legitimate purpose" was not comparable to the phrase contained in the
Chicago Ordinance, which the Morales Court held to be unconstitu-
tional.266 Accordingly, the Kansas Supreme Court held that the lan-
guage was not so vague as to render it unconstitutional because any rea-
sonable law enforcement authority could readily determine whether a
"legitimate purpose" was present. 267
V. IMPACT
The varying opinions in Morales III demonstrate a keen awareness of
the difficulties facing communities in connection with their efforts to
combat the dilatory effects that gang violence has on urban neighbor-
hoods.268 The opinion provides a foundation upon which supporters of
community policing may build their grass roots efforts in encouraging
city leaders to more aggressively police problem neighborhoods. 269 Ac-
cordingly, community activists will be encouraged in light of the
Court's apparent willingness to uphold an ordinance that is worded such
that it eliminates any ambiguities regarding notice and police discre-
264. See State v. Rucker, Nos. 80106 & 80753, 1999 WL 499745, at *17 (Kan. July 16,
1999).
265. See id. at *11 (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3438(d)(2) (1995)).
266. See id. at * 17.
267. See id.
268. See Morales I1, 119 S. Ct. 1849, 1856 (1999) (acknowledging that the "basic factual
predicate for the city's ordinance is not in dispute"), aff'g 657 N.E.2d 53 (I11. 1997); see also id.
at 1879-80 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas stated that, "[t]he human costs exacted by
criminal street gangs are inestimable. In many of our Nation's cities, gangs have '[v]irtually
overtak[en] certain neighborhoods, contributing to the economic and social decline of these areas
and causing fear and lifestyle changes among law-abiding residents."' Id. (Thomas, J., dissent-
ing) (quoting OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, MONOGRAPH: URBAN STREET GANG ENFORCEMENT 3 (1997)). Justice Tho-
mas's dissent went even further: "Today, the Court focuses extensively on the 'rights' of gang
members and their companions. It can safely do so-the people who will have to live with the
consequences of today's opinion do not live in our neighborhoods." Id. at 1887. (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
269. See id. at 1864 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (pro-
viding a roadmap for lawmakers to possibly draft a similar ordinance that may not be deemed
constitutionally vague).
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tion. 270 In fact, when this Court is confronted with a more specifically
worded ordinance, which avoids the mire of vagueness, the Court will
likely find that community safety concerns outweigh an individual's
fundamental liberty interests.
In all likelihood, cities nationwide will undertake efforts to draft
similar legislation, guided by this opinion,271 and will inevitably enact
ordinances that in most respects would result in the same type of dis-
criminatory enforcement. Unfortunately, the nature of most loitering
ordinances inevitably leads to the harassment of many youths who are
innocently strolling their neighborhoods. 272
As suggested by Justice O'Connor, it appears that certain inconse-
quential revisions may enable the Court to deem a loitering statute con-
stitutional.273 First, as Justice O'Connor suggested, by merely inter-
preting the term "loiter" to include a second element of criminal
activity, a similar ordinance may pass constitutional muster.274 Second,
legislatures will also need to take an additional step of providing suffi-
cient guidelines for law enforcement authorities to prevent arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement. 275  Neither of these suggestions, however,
will further the protection of individual freedoms which may neverthe-
less be threatened by such ordinances.
Because only three of the six Justices in the majority agreed that loi-
tering is a constitutionally protected liberty interest, 276 the future of this
individual freedom is tenuous. The Morales III Court did not extol the
virtues of a person's freedom to wander or stroll from place to place as
the Court did unanimously twenty-seven years earlier in Papachris-
tou.277  Therefore, it is unclear to what extent the Court will allow a
270. See supra Part III.A (discussing the majority's findings).
271. In response to the news of this holding, Chicago Mayor, Richard M. Daley, indicated that
work would begin immediately to devise a law that will correct the defects of the current Ordi-
nance and allow the city to move forward in its efforts to combat gang activity. See Jan Crawford
Greenburg, Top Court Ruling Shows Way to a Legal Anti-Loitering Law, CHI. TRIB., June 1I,
1999. § 1, at 1.
272. See generally Warren Friedman, Wasted Opportunities?, 4 NEIGHBORHOODS 2 (Fall
1998).
273. See Morales Il, 119 S. Ct. at 1864-65 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring
in judgment); supra notes 198, 253 and accompanying text (discussing Justice O'Connor's con-
curring opinion).
274. See Morales 111, 119 S. Ct. at 1864-65 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring
in judgment).
275. See id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
276. See supra Part III.B (discussing the plurality's finding of a protected liberty interest in
freedom to loiter for innocent purposes).
277. See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 164 (1972); see also Tony
Mauro, First Amendment Not a Victor in Defeat of Chicago Anti-Gang Ordinance (visited June
1999]
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trade off between public protection and such individual freedom in the
future. 278
VI. CONCLUSION
A severely divided Court has failed to adequately protect the freedom
of individuals to wander the streets of America-without apparent pur-
pose-without fear of recrimination by police. This Court, in opting for
the middle ground, in all likelihood has placed the value of community
safety above that of individuals and their personal freedom to move
freely throughout their community. In other words, when this Court is
presented with a more precisely worded ordinance, it will surely find
that there are legitimate state interests that outweigh certain fundamen-
tal individual rights and will uphold such an ordinance. The true test
will come when a similar statute that is not deemed unconstitutionally
vague is presented to the Court and the Court decides whether to apply a
stricter overbreadth analysis in furthering the fundamental principles of
our Constitution. The Morales III decision does not provide much com-
21, 1999) <http://www.freedomforum.org/assembly/l999/6/1 lsctantigang.asp> (noting that the
Supreme Court struck down an ordinance similar to that in Papachristou, "but with none of the
same lofty language and scant mention of the First Amendment and the Papachristou ruling it-
self").
278. Following the Court's decision in Morales III, lower courts have already begun acknowl-
edging its holdings. For example, in In re Jason Allen D., a Maryland appellate court failed to
address a defendant's constitutional challenges to a trespassing statute and, ultimately, reversed
the defendant's conviction on other grounds. See In re Jason Allen D., 733 A.2d 351, 353 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1999). The statute at issue allowed a police officer to order an individual to dis-
perse from public housing property when the individual was standing idly by, even in the absence
of complaints of criminal activity. See id. at 353. In reaching its decision, the Maryland court
noted the United States Supreme Court's holding in Morales III that: (1) there is a fundamental
liberty interest to loiter for innocent purposes; and (2) the Ordinance did not impact the social
contact between gang members and others in the community and, therefore, did not infringe upon
the First Amendment right of association. See id. at 366 & n.6.
Similarly, in State v. Pussel, the Ohio court affirmed defendants' convictions under an Ohio
disorderly conduct statute. See State v. Pussel, Nos. CA98-07-153 & CA98-07-154, 1999 WL
543828, at *6 (Ohio Ct. App. July 19, 1999). After attending a rally, police ordered the defen-
dants to disperse from the immediate area due to what the police deemed to be a likelihood of
serious public inconvenience. See id. at *3-4. Defendants failed to obey the dispersal order and
the police subsequently charged and convicted them for failure to disperse. See id. at * 1-2. De-
fendants asserted that the convictions violated their First Amendment rights. See id. at *5. The
court held that the defendants' arrests occurred after the rally had ended and, thus, the protected
activity had ceased prior to the arrests. See id. In addition, the court explained that although the
freedom to loiter for innocent purposes is a protected liberty interest as recognized in Morales III,
"the right to assemble may be constitutionally limited" pursuant to Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham,
382 U.S. 87 (1965). Id. at *5.
City of Chicago v. Morales
fort that this Court will advance the premise that "[o]ur Constitution is
designed to maximize individual freedoms within a framework of or-
dered liberty." 2
79
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279. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983).
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